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One of the sharpest and most constant criticisms which Paul Althaus
leveled against Karl Barth's views of the non-Christian world was that
of Christomonism.1 Althaus feit that the basic lack and the abiding sin in
Barth's evaluation of the religions was his narrow, restrictive, exclusive
understanding of the reality of Christ, which bans all extra-Christian
reality into the realm of meaninglessness and godlessness. Althaus, indeed,
was not alone in such accusations.2. He voiced an objection which, he feit,
every Christian theologian must make: because Barth's vision of Christ
was too narrow, too "monistic", because he set undue limitations on
Christ — he missed the breadth of God's plan of salvation and the
religions' role in this plan. Barth' understanding of religion and the
religions is christomonistic — and therefore to be rejected.8
Is such a diagnosis correct? Unfortunately, Althaus, like many of
Barth's critics, never spelled out in detail just how Christomonism vi-
tiated his views of the religions. Others, therefore, warn of oversimpli-
fying or misinterpreting Barth's sweeping, harshly condemnatory State-
ments on the religions.4 The "Theologischer Konvent Augsburgischen
Bekenntnisses" in 1963 cautioned against making a "Popanz" of Barth's
description of religions in the Kirchliche Dogmatik* And more recently
1 Cf. especially Die Christliche Wahrheit (Gütersloh, 1966, 7th ed.), pp. 56—60, 138;
also, "Theologie und Geschichte, Zur Auseinandersetzung mit der dialektischen Theo-
logie," ZSyTh 1(1923) 741—786, although in this early article Althaus does not use
the term "Christomonism".
2 It was the question of God's activity outside of Christ which split the "Zwischen der
Zeit" movement. Brunner's rejection of Barth's narrow views triggered the hefty
"Nein" controversy in the 1930's. For Tillich it was Barth's "Supernaturalism"
whidi was untenab/e; cf. "What is vereng with the 'Diafectical' Theoiogy?"
The Journal of Religion 15 (1935) 127—145, and "Natural and Reveaied Religion",
Christendom, 1935, pp. 159—170. In a different context but with the same intent,
Bonhoeffer could accuse Barth of "Offenbarungspositivismus", in Widerstand und
Ergebung, 1951, pp. 170, 184. Other contcmporaries of Althaus who rejected Barth's
doctrine on revelation werc Fr. Brunstäcl, H. Schreiner, Fr. Büchsel, Fr. K. Schumann.
3 Althaus, it should be notcd, did not mercly criticize. His own positive efforts to
correct Barth represent onc of the earlicst and most noteworthy attempts at a
"Protestant Theoiogy of the Non-Christian Religions". cf. Paul Knitter, "An
Attempt at a Protestant Theoiogy of the Non-Christian Religions: Paul Althaus",
Verbum SVD, 11 (1970) 214—235.
4 W. Anderson, »Die theologische Sicht der Religionen auf den Weltmissionskonferen-
zen von Jerusalem (1928) und Madras (1938) und die Theologie der Religionen bei
Karl Barth," Fuldaer Hefte, 16, Berlin, 1966, pp. 33—34, 54.
5 Report by Eugen Rose, ibid., p. 194.
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C.S.Song in a doctoral dissertation for Union Theological Seminary
sweepingly affirms that those who criticize Barth's doctrine on the re-
ligions for its narrowness, have misread its deeper content: Barth's last
word on the religions is positive!6 Finally it must be remembered that
Barth's "cruelty" towards the religions was also aimed at Christianity.
Can his final verdict therefore be totally negative or the product of
Christomonism?
It is the purpose of this article to carry out and, in a sense, to test
Althaus' diagnosis. We will examine Barth's most direct and succinct
treatment of the religions — Paragraph 17 of his Kirchliche Dogmatik
(to be referred to äs KD 17)7 — for the presence of Christomonism. To do
this properly, our analysis of KD 17 will be made in the light of Barth's
early encounter with the religions in his Römerbrief (second edition —
referred to äs RB).8 Such a study will indicate that Althaus' diagnosis,
though simply and somewhat rashly stated, seems to be valid: Christo-
monism does form the deepest roots of Barth's evaluation of the religions.
It was also the factor which marked the development of Barth's thinking
on the religions from RB to KD 17 and which made his final verdict all
the more negative and harsh.
In concentrating on KD 17 and RB we are, äs is clear, limiting our study to
Barth's early period.9 Such an apparently peremptory limitation is, we feel, justified
by the following considerations:
8 The Relation of Divine Revelation and Man's Religions in the Theologies of Karl
Barth and Paul Tillich, 1965. Song's work will be referred to later. C. A. Keller
also attempts a positive reinterpretation of Barth's doctrine on the religions but
more in the light of his anthropology in later volumes of KD: "Versuch einer
Deutung heidnischer Religion (im Anschluß an Karl Barths Lehre vom Menschen)",
Ev. Missionsmagazin, 1956, pp. 70 ff.
7 1/2, (Zollikon-Zürich, 1960), pp. 304—397.
8 Zürich, 1940 — 2nd edition first published in München, 1922.
9 The periods in Barth' s theological maturation are not precisely definable. Precinding
from his earliest years when he was still wandering in the Liberalism of his teachers
Hermann and Harnack, we may distinguish two general periods: Exdusive Trans-
cendence, extending approximately from 1922 to 1940, and fnclusive Transcendence,
which went on to his death. The pulsing heart behind Barth's mammoth theological
production is God's transcendence — the superiority and independence of the divine
over the human. But in his first period Barth presented this transcendence in such a
way äs to "exclude" the human. This period may be divided into a philosophical
and a theological phase. In the first phase, which extends roughly from 1922 to 1931
and is represented chiefly by the Römerbrief, Barth's starting point and method are
clothed in philosophical-dualistic categories, especially those of Kierkegaard and
Plato. In his Christliche Dogmatik of 1927 Barth sought to give his thought a more
theological foundation and expression, but this first attempt was not entirely
successful. His book on Anselm, 1931, marks the turning point at which Barth
clearly affirmed Anselm's "credo ut intelligam" and took his stand soundly on
God's Word äs the sole foundation and starting point for his theology. On this
foundation he was to construct the volumes of KD. And on this foundation,
gradually, Barth was to see God's transcendence äs inclusive — not only rejecting
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1) It was during this pcriod that Barth most explicitly confronted the religions and
most clearly elaborated his views on them.10
2) The verdict he voiced during this period, more than any of his subsequent works,
had a predominating and lasting influence on Protestant attitudes towards the
religions.11
3) Even though Barth's Christomonism is reinterpreted and tempered in later volumes
of KD — especially in such questions äs Creation, III/l, pp. 44—377, Anthropology,
III/2, pp. 82—241, the Analogia Relationis or Fidei, III/l, p. 207 ff. and 220 ff., the
possibility of "other words" and other lights extra muros ecclesiae (IV/3, pp. 40—187)
— his view of the non-Christian religions remains basically the same, i. e. christomo-
nistic. This we hope to substantiate in a subsequent study.
I. Extra Christum Julia Revelatio (The staring point
for Barth's evaluation of the religions)
A. KD 17: Christomonism
The starting point and Foundation of Barth's entire evaluation of the
religions are found in the first paragraph of KD 17. Speaking of revela-
tion äs the reality which expresses the relationship between the divine and
the human, Barth states, with utmost clarity, that this reality is solely in
God's hands and absolutely outside of man's reach. In no way can revela-
tion stem from, be prepared for, or be conditioned by the human. Revela-
tion and man — God and man — come from two different worlds, and
therefore any kind of "Zusammenspiel" between the two is absolutely
excluded. Of himself, man has no "Organ", no "Anknüpfungspunkt",
no "Eignung oder Aufnahmefähigkeit" for revelation. Both in its "Wirk-
lichkeit und Möglichkeit", "Aktualität und Potentialität", revelation is
entirely beyond man. In viewing (and experiencing) his position before
God, man cannot speak of a "Können", "Bedürfen", "Müssen". All that
can be said is: "Er kann nidn". (KD17, 305, 328; cf. also KD 1/2,
41—43)
but affirming and embracing the human. This realization is still dormant in KD I
(1932—38) (perhaps because of tf ie natural theology controversy with Brunner and
the menacing "theological implications" ot National Socialism), bcgins to stir in
KD II (1940—42) and comcs to f ü l l form in KD III (1945). (cf. Hans Urs von
Balthasar, Karl Barth, Darstellung und Deutung seiner Theologie (Köln, 1962),
pp. 99, 101 — 102, 116—117, 124; S. A. Matczak, Karl Barth on God (New York,
1962), p. 174; H. Bouillard, "Karl Barth", LThK, II, 5—8; G. Gloege, "Karl
Barth", RGG I, 894—98.
10 Klaus Nürnberger calls KD 17 an "einschlägige Behandlung" of the religions which
" . . . erlaubt eine für die Arbeit an Barth sonst selten erreichbare Konzentration der
Analyse." Glaube und Religion bei Karl Barth (Inaugural-Dissertation, Philipps
Universität, Marburg), 1967, p. 14.
11 C. H. Ratschow, "Religion, theologisch", RGG, V, 976; Peter Beyerhaus, "Zur Theo-
logie der Religionen im Protestantismus", Kerygma und Dogma 15 (1969) 88—89;
Hans-Werner Gensichen, "Wirklichkeit und Wahrheit der Religionen", Lutherische
Monatshefte, Januar 1968, p. 95; Nürnberger, p. 134.
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Barth's starting point then is a theme which is heralded throughout
his entire theological career: the transcendence of God and the finiteness
of man, man's inability to find — even search for — God in and by him-
self, the necessity of God "doing all", the impossibility of beginning
with anything human when speaking of the divine. This starting point
might be called a form of "monism": in the mystery of communication
between the divine and the human, only God is real; his activity pre-
cludes, absorbes, and in a sense negates all human activity.
But why? On what grounds does Barth proclaim this "monistic"
understanding of revelation and of the relationship between God and
man? The answer is given, indirectly, throughout KD 17 and constitutes
a basic building block in Barth's theology: because of Jesus Christ! Because
revelation has become a reality in Christ, it cannot be real anywhere
eise. That fact that God touched the world at one precise historical,
mathematical point means, for Barth, that he comes into contact with the
human (and vice versa) nowhere eise. Barth's monism in KD 17 is a
Christomonism.
This christomonistic understanding of God's activity is unveiled
clearly in the two theological "facts" which for Barth are basic in judging
the non-Christian world: God has offered his "Selbstdarbietung und
Selbstdarstellung" (revelation) (KD17, 328 ff.), he has offered his
"Gnade" (justification) (KD17, 335 ff.) once, in the reality of Jesus
Christ. Only in him. Therefore, no revelation, no salvation anywhere
eise. Therefore, the total Separation of the human and the divine. There-
forey the absolute inability of man to know God, to know revelation
"so daß die Versuche des Menschen, Gott von sich zu erkennen, zwar nicht
auf Grund einer prinzipiellen, wohl aber auf Grund einer praktisch fakti-
schen Notwendigkeit, allgemein und gänzlich — umsonst sind" (KD 17,
328, also 335—336). The practical, factual necessity stems from God's
revelation in Christ — negating all other forms of revelation. All of man's
attempts to know God, outside of Christ, are not only futile but counter-
active; they not only miss the truth, but they fall into untruth, into a
"Fiktion", into a "Gegengott" — all because "Wahrheit" is only in
Christ (KD 17, 330—331).
This, for Barth, is the message of the New Testament: faith and
contact with God become possible in Christ. Therefore they are possible
nowhere eise. Everything eise is man's own "Werke" — the "Gesetz"
which seals man's sinfulness and Separation from God. (KD 17, 334—43).
Barth can even Interpret the NT texts which traditionally have been
the basis for a "general relevation" and a more positive theology of the re-
ligions. (Ro. l, 18 ff; Ro. 2, 14; Acts 14, 15 ff; 17, 22) äs o support for his
Christomonism. Althaus terms Barth's exegetical feats with these texts
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"Künstlichkeit" and "rein aprioristisch-abstrakt".12 Firstly, Barth
promptly dispatches the Ro. 2 text about the heathen "doing by nature
what the law requires" äs irrelevant since here Paul is speaking about
Christian-heathen. (KD17, 332; /1, 131)18 Concerning the "general
revelation" in Ro. l, 18 ff, Barth again turns the tables: these Statements
of Paul must be understood äs "Bestandteil des apostolischen Kerygmas
... nicht gelöst von der Situation der apostolischen Predigt, nicht gelöst
von der Fleischwerdung des Wortes." Exegetically this may be correct,
but Barth goes on to conclude: therefore, this revelation of God through
nature can be real for man only in and after his revelation through Christ!
In no way was Paul referring to an "Offenbarungsbesitz" for the
heathen, in no way did he wish to "hook onto" ("anknüpfen") a know-
ledge of God which they had through a form of "Uroffenbarung". "Die
Heiden haben eben die Erkenntnis von PS. 19 prinzipiell nie auch im
geringsten realisiert." — Barth even holds that the heathen cannot
experience their own sinfulness, i. e. God's wrath, until they have met
God's reality in Christ's revelations (identification of Law and Gospel).
(KD 17, 334—335)
These texts therefore are really pointing out man's total inability
to know God before Christ, i.e. the futility and sinfulness of all his
attempts to find the divinity. This, according to Barth, is the intent of
Acts 14,15 and 17,22 ff; Paul, Standing in the light of Christ's revelation,
could teil the heathen that the God they were seeking is the creator, the
supreme, transcendent Lord of all; this means that all their attempts to
know him not only fall short, but fall into idolatry: "Weil Gott der
Schöpfer und also der Herr ist ... darum und nur darum können wir
sündigen in Abgotterei." (KD 17, 333) In this sense God has not left man
without a witness: "Denn eben in und mit der Verkündigung der Gnade
in Christus (only then!) wird ihnen ja das Zeugnis Gottes aufgedeckt, von
dem sie abgefallen, zu dem sie in radikalen Widerspruch geraten sind",
(loc. cit.) Because God's truth has shone in Christ, all previous searchings
for this truth are "der Wahrheit . . . in einem Winkel von 180° entgegen-
gesetzt ... ein eigensinniges und eigenmächtiges Himmelstürmen ... Gott-
losigkeit und Unbotmäßigkeit". (KD 17, 332—33)
This then is Barth's Interpretation of the NTs and the Reformers'
"solus Christus". As Althaus sarcastically observes, Barth here "corrects"
the Reformers: the "solus" must be taken äs absolute and must apply not
only to man's work, but also to his ability to know God: both have
nothing to do with the real God.14 If God had not chosen to act in Christ,
12 Christliche Wahrheit, pp. 39, 59.
13 For Althaus this is a "reiner Verzweiflungsakt". Althaus argues that if Paul were
speaking about Christians he would never say they fulfill the law "by nature" but by
the Spirit. ibid., p. 40.
14 ibid., p. 57.
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perhaps things would be different; but because he did, we must draw the
consequences.15 And on the basis of these christomonistic consequences —
the fUtility of the human because of Christ — Barth in KD 17 constructs
his appraisal of the religions.
B. RB: Immanentistic Monism
In general, we may say that Barth's understanding of the relation-
ship between God and man and the possibility of revelation in and
through the human is just äs "monistic" in RB äs it is in KD 17. On every
page of RB, Barth presupposes and ruthlessly proclaims a Todeslinie
between the divine and the human: the absolute difference and total
Separation between time and eternity, between the "Unanschaulich" and
the "Anschaulich". The only relationship between the two is a contrary-
relation which indicates a non-relation! God Stands "in unendlichem
qualitativen Unterschied" to man; he is man's "reine Grenze", and
therefore "nie und nimmer identisch mit dem, was wir Gott nennen, als
Gott erleben, ahnen und anbeten..." (RB 315) "Immer ist Gott dem
Menschen jenseitig, neu, fern, fremd, überlegen, nie in seinem Bereich,
nie in seinem Besitz..." (RB 96, cf. also 103) Looking at this Situation
from man's side, all Barth can say is: "Fleisch heißt radikalste Unzuläng-
lichkeit des Geschöpfes gegenüber dem Schöpfer." (RB 63) Whatever is
human and "anschaulich" — whether it be diurch or cult or history or
religious experience — cannot establish contact with the divine, the tran-
scendent, the "unanschaulich" (cf. RB, 33, 47, 105, 82, 220) And not only
is man totally separated from God; also, any attempt he makes to bridge
the gap and to hear a divine revelation will end up in "Ehrfurchtslosig-
keit" and "Unbotmäßigkeit". Again, this is Barth's exegesis of Ro. 1,18.
(RB,20)
Therefore if God is to approach man, if he is to set up any kind of
a contact and "reveal" himself, he will be able to do this only by pro-
nouncing (or repeating) an absolute "Nein" to all that is human. "Anders
aJs in der Negation des Geschöpfes ist die Position des Schöpfers und der
15 Other theologians — and perhaps Barth in later years — would draw different
consequences: God's revealing and saving activity in Christ is not interpreted exclu-
sively but cosmically; it does not negate other forms of revelation but assumes and
affirms them. Barth's inability to do this is apparently due to the fact that he does
not take the Incarnation seriously enough; the human is not fully and genuinely —
in all its aspects — assumed by the divine. cf. Regin Prenter, "Karl Barths Umbil-
dung der traditionellen Zweinaturlehre in lutherischer Beleuchtung", Studia Theolo-
gica 11 (1957), p 65. For the cosmic Interpretation of Christ in ecumenical theology
of the religions cf. J. Sittler, "Zur Einheit berufen", Neu-Delhi 1961, Dokumentar-
bericht, hrsg. v. W. A. Visser t'Hooft, (Stuttgart, 1962), pp. 512—523; Horst Bürkle,
"Die Frage nach dem 'kosmischen Christus* als Beispiel einer ökumenisch orientier-
ten Theologie," Indische Beiträge zur Theologie der Gegenwart, hrsg. v. H. Bürkle,
(Stuttgart, 1966), pp. 248—65.
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ewige Sinn des Geschöpfes noch nie erkannt worden." (RB, 62) Reve-
lation therefore comes in the form of an "Aufhebung" of all that went
before it; it will always be a "no" to man, a pure beginning, an entirely
"neue Welt", an absolute "Wunder", a reality which takes shape in a
"Hohlraum". Here we feel the füll impact of the Barthian "senkrecht
von oben" (RB, 77, 62,97,102—103,98,181—82, 84)
Even though KD 17 and RB present the same monistic view of reve-
lation and communication between God and man, they differ in the
foundation they give to these views. In KD 17 the foundation was theo-
logical or better, christological: Christomonism. In RB Barth bases his
claims more on a philosophical standpoint which might be called
immanentism™
This is due primarily to RB's "Sitz im Leben". Barth penned its
pages amid the heat of his rejection of liberal theology and of the age's
(and theology's) excessive concern with the human. This rejection was to
be an enduring force behind all his theology. Yet, in these early years he
began by fighting fire with fire; he took over äs his first premise and
starting point the age's immanentistic understanding of man and all
reality: man is only man, he is entirely cut off from anything that is or
might be beyond; all his undertakings are shackled within the border
of his own visible world. Of course Barth would go on and, by appealing
to God's Word, would say that is not the füll picture; there is an answer
to this Situation. But the Situation äs it Stands, he accepts — not so much
on the basis of God's Word, but according to the "words" and in the
dualistic categories of Plato, Kant, Dostojewski], F. Overbeck, both Blum-
hardts and especially Kierkegaard. (RB, 234)17 Barth's monism, therefore,
äs we find it in RB is äs Althaus states, not so much "eine theologische
Nötigung (i. e. based on God's Word or on Christ), sondern eine bestimmte
philosophische-weltanschauliche Haltung". Althaus can even call it
"eine Art natürlicher Theologie negativen Inhalts"!18 Barth's monism in
RB is not so much "Christic" äs "immanentistic".
But is there any practical diffrrenc? between Barrh's immanentist'ic
monism in RB and his Christomonism in KD 17? Both seem to be two
sides of the same coin: in RB Barth begins with immanentism and con-
cludes to Christomonism, i. e. sincc there is this unbridgeable rift between
16 This is not to say that a theological basis for Barth's monism in RB is entirely
lacking. He points to both crcation and sin äs determining factors in the abyss bet-
ween God and man. RB, 233; cf. Matuzak, p. 298.
17 Credo, München, 1935, p. 159; Evangelische Theologie, 1949, pp. 271—72; cf. also
Barth's admissions in his acceptancc spccch for the Sonning Award in Kopenhagen,
April 1963, quoted in H. Zahrnt, Die Sache mit Gott (München, 1968), p. 29.
18 Christliche Wahrheit, pp. 56—57, 138; "Thec'logie und Geschichte", 742—43, 753;
J. Aagaard, "Revelation and Religion", Studiia Theologica 14 (1960) 158; Gloege,
895.
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the divine and the human, since revelation can in no way begin with man,
therefore God can speak only in Christ. In KD 17 Barth Starts with
Christomonism and concludes to immanentism, i. e. since God has spoken
only in Christ, therefore he speaks nowhere eise, therefore there is the
abyss between God and man. In RB, then, Barth begins with the Todes-
linie and concludes to the "solus Christus"; in KD 17, he Starts with the
"solus Christus" and arrives at the Todeslinie. As Nürnberger argues, in
KD 17 Barth seems merely to be reversing his line of argumentation —
merely redressing RB's immanentism in theological garb. In KD 17 Barth
realized that he had to discard the philosophical wardrobe of RB and of
the Prolegomena and become more a theologian by arguing only from
God's Word. Yet all he really does is restate and reconfirm his immanent-
istic position through what Nürnberger obtusely terms "das positivierte
Negativ des Begriffes der Offenbarung": the positive fact of God reveal-
ing himself in Christ converges with and confirms the negative Statement
of immanentism, i. e. that man, by himself, is entirely separated from the
divine.19 Essentially, though, there is no difference in Barth's understand-
ing of the human.
Even though Barth's Christomonism in KD 17 and his Immanent-
istic Monism in RB are similar in their general assertions, they show
marked differences when applied to Barth's evaluation of religion and
the religions. His Christomonism may have been "predetermined" by his
immanentism, äs Nürnberger holds; yet the fact that this immanentism
receives a theological-christological foundation forces Barth into an all
the more negative, harsh, and "monistic" understanding of the religions.
(This Nürnberger does not point out.) Christomonism becomes the ulti-
mate reason for his total condemnation of the religions. This we hope to
prove in the ensuing pages.
H. Extra Christum Nulla Religio
A. KD 17's Verdict: Total Rejection
From his christomonistic premises — and with all the rigor of a
Thomistic syllogism — Barth draws his conclusions on the religions.20
Everything he says about the religions is "in the name of revelation" —
19 Nürnberger, 25—30, 44, 61, 116; Nürnberger convincingly braces such claims by
showing the strong influence which Feuerbach exercised on Barth at the time of
KD 17's composition. cf. pp. 49, 39—45, 50, 59. Beyerhaus goes so far äs to claim
that under Barth's influence Feuerbach became a "negative Doctor Ecclesiae."
op. cit., p. 89.
20 In this section we shall be referring to "religion" and "the religions" indiscriminate-
ly. All that Barth says here about religion in general can apply to every religion.
He makes exceptions or restrictions only when speaking about the "justification"
of religion — which is the topic of our next section.
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"indem die Offenbarung auf den Plan tritt...« (KD 17,335), "gemessen
an der Offenbarung" (KD17, 332) — i.e. revelation äs coming
exclusively in and from Christ. From this standpoint he can proclaim his
sweeping verdict: "Religion ist Unglaube. Religion ist eine Angelegen-
heit, man muß geradezu sagen, die Angelegenheit des gottlosen Men-
schen" (KD 17, 327) The reasoning is clear: because revelation has come
in Christ and only in him, religion must be seen äs man's attempt to do
what only Christ can do: reveal and please God. "Religion von der Offen-
barung her gesehen (i. e. a christonomistic revelation) wird sichtbar als
das Unternehmen des Menschen, dem was Gott in seiner Offenbarung
(i. e. only in Christ) tun will und tut, vorzugreifen, an die Stelle des gött-
lichen Werkes ein menschliches Gemachte zu schieben, will sagen: an die
Stelle der göttlichen Wirklichkeit, die sich uns in der Offenbarung dar-
bietet und darstellt (i. e. only in Christ) ein Bild von Gott, das der Mensch
sich eigensinnig und eigenmächtig entworfen hat." (KD 17, 329) Because
the religions seek to do what has been done and can be done only in Christ,
they are totally opposed to Christ and his revelation (KD 17, 320, 335);
they are an abomination to God; in no way can they lead men to God, but
only away from him. (KD 17,337—338; 330—331)
Barth, at the same time, admits that for the human eye there are
many similarities between the religions and Christ's revelation, that the
same "Elemente und Probleme" are burning in the interior of all reli-
gions. He does not deny that there is human good to be found in the
religions, and he refrains from all practical "negative Werturteile". Yet
despite all these similarities and positive elements he insists that we must
allow "das göttliche Urteil" to fall on the religions. If we take revelation
seriously, i. e. revelation only in Christ, then all this possible religious
good remains essentially and thoroughly Unglaube. (KD17, 306—07;
327) Barth's view of the religions, then, is rooted firmly and incorrigibly
in his Christomonism.
Barth also tries to give a "phenomenological proof" äs a support for this theo-
logical-christomonistic vera'id. A Stlldy of the history and pJienomenoJogy of
religions provides us, he argues, with a confirmation that religion is a purely
"human affair" and is thereforc "ein sich selbst widersprechendes, ein sich selbst
unmögliches Unternehmen". (KD 17, 343) An analysis of Barth's "phenomenological
proof", however, would secm to indicate that it is made through the glasses of his
christomonistic principles.
Barth feels that running throughout the history of religions is a spontaneous
"kritische Wendung" against religion, a natural rejection of religion. It comes
primarily in the form of mysticism and atheism. Both react against and seek to
remove religion in its principlc manifestations: "die Gestaltung der Gottheit und die
Erfüllung des Gesetzes." (KD 17, 344) Mysticism without wiping out the entirety
of religion, would do away with all cxtcrnal form; it interprets religion radically in
a "gestalt- und werkloser Innenraum". Atheism is even more radical and aims at
removing the gods. Both seek the same objective and complement each other;
mysticism, despite its religious character, is arr esoteric atheism: " Die den Atheismus
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meinende Mystik und der die Mystik . . . interpretierende Atheismus ..." (KD 17,
347—348; 352).
One might question Barth's Interpretation of such a "Wendung". More pressing
questions arise when he gives the reason for this "turn against religion". Mysticism
and atheism, he states, reject religion and its laws and gods because they realize,
implicitly and spontaneously, that religion is but a useless game which man is
carrying on with himself. Man already käs what he thinks he is seeking in religion: his
"religiöser Besitz". In his gods and laws he already is in possession of the truth he
thinks he is searching for. Religion is "... das spielerische Bedürfnis nach Veräußer-
lichung eines vor dieser Veräußerlichung und ohne sie bestehenden religiösen Be-
sitzes". (KD 17, 344—47) Mysticism and atheism feel the fUtility of this game;
they feel that religion is a "non-necessity".
But they do not fully realize why. Theirs is a blind, unconscious reaction. Barth
goes on to explain the true basis and motivation of their action—and here, quite
evidently, he puts on his christomonistic glasses. He explains the "religiösen Besitz":
it is "das Vermögen, in der Welt und Mensch zu sein"! This is the origin of religion:
man's being äs man and his being in the world! This human, earth-bound "being"
is related to religion "wie die Quelle dem Strom, wie die Wurzel dem Baum".
Because this being—and nothing outside of this being—is the origin of religion,
religion becomes useless; man is passing the time with himself. Mysticism and atheism
themselves are nourished by this origin, i. e. by man's being; they themselves are
simply different, more refined examples of man äs closed and confined within
himself. Therefore they cannot win the struggle against religion; there-
fore they will eventually fall into other forms of religion, into other expres-
sions of man's "religiöser Besitz". Only Christ's revelation can break out of this
"game" by showing not only the uselessness of religion but also its true origin: man's
hidebound nature. (KD 17, 352—355)
Barth's "phenomenological" argument is clearly animated by and founded on
his preconceived understanding of religion äs originating only from man's "Ver-
mögen in der Welt und Mensch zu sein". And such an understanding, äs we have
seen, is a demand of his Christomonism.
Having stamped the religions äs "Unglaube" on the basis of his
Christomonism, whether in its "theological" or "phenomenological"
argumentation, Barth draws his practical conclusions. In no way may the
theologian or missionary seek a relationship between revelation and the
religions; in no way may he look for questions in religion for which reve-
lation supplies the answers; in no way may he look for an "Anknüp-
fung". Here he is faced with an incorrigible "Entweder-oder". The "ge-
ringste Abweichung, die geringste Konzession" in this matter spells heresy.
The one and only relationship revelation can have with the religions is
that of "Aufhebung". (KD 17, 320—321; 330—331) But concessions have
been made. "Religionismus" is for Barth the crying sin of Christian theo-
logy, whether in its Catholic form äs the "analogia entis", or in its culmi-
nating Protestant expression in the modernism and "Neuprotestantis-
mus" of the 19th and 20th centuries. (KD 17, 308—313)
All of this means that a "theology of religions" becomes impossible.
Because Barth's Christomonism forbids any "concession" to the religions,
the theologian who seeks after the "meaning" of the religions is stepping
outside his domain, wasting his time — no longer a theologian. KD 17 by
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no means offers a theology of religions. Its purpose is merely to present
all that is opposed to God's revelation — to clear the way. For Barth,
the religions are only "a negative background to his own unique
interest — revelation."21 This ostracizing of the religions explains why
Protestant theology to this date has been so remiss in confronting the
extra-Christian world.22 To give the religions a theological meaning is to
betray the unique (monistic) role of Christ.
B. RB'sVerdict:
1. Rejection
Because Barth's evaluation of the religions in RB was also based on
his monistic understanding of revelation, it is similar to KD's verdict. But
because this monism was not yet christic, there are also profound and
ref reshing dif f erences.
Arguing in RB f rom his Kierkegaardian immanentistic starting point,
Barth proclaims the same condemnation of religion that he does in KD 17.
Firstly, the religions are confined to this side of the Todeslinie — they
are purely and only human, in no way able to Step over into the world of
the divine. The familiär, dualistic terminology is applied to the religions:
"Was anschaulich wird, ist Religion und immer wieder Religion." (RB,
220) "Wer Gesetz, Religion, Erlebnis sagt, der sagt Werk des Menschen."
(RB, 83, 63) Barth can even state that "... die religiöse Erregung vom
Schlafbedürfnis nur durch Gradunterschiede getrennt ist." (RB, 217) Thus
religion is only "Anschauliches, Hohlraum, Entbehren, Ungenügen"
(RB, 98, 88, 114, 83—84), a "Verlängerung der Natur" (RB, 164), a pro-
jection of man himself. (RB, 218—219; cf. also 62, 67; 193—194) It is
the highest expression of what it means to be man — i. e. to be alone, cut
off f rom God. (RB, 234—235)
This most gruesome expression of his humanity is also the means by
which man constitutes himself a sinner. "Religion dient der Sünde als
Hebel". (RB, 231, 249) "Durch sie (Religion) sind die Sündenleidenschaf-
ten gegeben, geweckt, in Kraft gesetzt..." (RB, 218, 245) And all this
takes place, Barth proclaims with pathos, in man's "höchste, letzte, hoff-
nungsvollste, tiefsinnigste, reinste, /äheste Möglichkeit", in the "Gipfel
der menschlichen Möglichkeiten" (RB, 240, 164, 235, 55) — precisely
here man becomes a sinner! Precisely here, where man reaches out for
God, he proclaims himself a "Frevler"! Here is where he falls into the
two fundamental sins of all religious understanding: the raising up of
false gods and the attempt to save oneself through one's own works. It is
21 Aagaard, p. 158; Nürnberger, pp. 105—111,116.
22 Ratschow, op. cit., 976; Ernst Benz, "Ideen zu einer Theologie der Religions-
geschichte," Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Abhandlungen der
Geistes- und Sozialwisscnschaftlichen Klasse, 5 (1960) p. 32; Beycrhaus, p. 100.
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the proclamation of man's "Eritis sicut Deus" (RB, 20, 25, 63, 84—5, 98,
213,218,226)
This is the same harrowing verdict we heard in KD 17: religion is
Unglaube, sin. But in RB the origin of this sinfulness is different: whereas
in KD 17 the religions' sin stems f rom their Usurpation of Christ's unique
role, in RB it consists chiefly in the human attempt to cross the Todeslinie.
This is allowed to no human (on the grounds of the Kierkegaardian cleft)
and the religions are solely human. The sinfulness of the religious man is
that he "verwechselt die Zeit mit der Ewigkeit. Er wagt was er nicht
wagen dürfte; er greift hinaus über die ihm gesetzte Todeslinie (set by
Kierkegaard!) nach dem unsterblichen unbekannten Gott ... Er macht
Gott zu einem Ding unter Dingen in seiner Welt." (RB, 226) This "Ver-
dinglidiung und Vermenschlichung des Göttlichen" (RB, 53), this attempt
"den Vogel im Fluge abzubilden" (RB, 163), this seeking to make "aus
der lebendigen Abstraktion von allen Konkretheiten eine Konkretheit"
(RB, 23) — this is the essence of the religions' sinfulness.
And therefore the religions must be "aufgehoben"! This is the same
"conclusion" we heard in KD 17. When God's message of salvation
arrives in the "Religionsjahrmarkt" then is proclaimed "das unvermeid-
liche Gericht über allen religiösen Betrug" (RB, 101), then the "falsche
Münzen" must disappear (RB, 13). Because the religions seek to cross the
abyss, they are a "Nichtseinsollendes", — and must "die" (RB, 106, 235,
112). Christ must be their total "Aufhebung" (RB, 315—16, 252), their
"gänzliche Erledigung". (RB, 216,165)
2. Partial Acceptance
The religions then are purely human, sinful, to be abolished. Yet this
is not the whole picture. RB also presents another, a more positive view
of the religions which, paradoxically, is blended with his negative view.
Such a blending, such a positive side of the religions is lacking in KD 17;
Christomonism wouJd not allow it. This "partial acceptance" of the
religions can be traced in their origin, function, and fulfillment.
As to the origin of religion, Barth cautiously states that although
religion äs we experience it today is confined to this side of the Todes-
linie, its deeper sources spring f rom what he terms man's original identity
with God, his original "Einheit mit Gott" (RB, 146), his "verlorene
Unmittelbarkeit zu Gott" (RB, 212, 151), his "ewiger Ursprung" (RB,
224). Even though the might of sin has opened the Kierkegaardian abyss
between time and eternity, Barth can still admit that "die auch durch die
Sünde nicht abgebrochene Beziehung Gottes zu uns" remains. And vice
versa, man's relation to God somehow still remains and dynamically
makes up "eine bestimmte Qualifizierung aller Menschenzeit." (RB, 231
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—232)23 — This "Verhältnis Gottes zum Menschen" which is "ursprüng-
lich und anfänglich" is "die Voraussetzung der geschichtlichen Wirklich-
keit der Religion." (RB, 104) Religion is a reality "... kraft des (bewuß-
ten oder unbewußten) Hergangs und Zustands seiner (man's) Beziehung
zu Gott." (RB, 224) This would explain why religion is a universal pheno-
menon, why man has "keine andere Wahl, als irgendwie ein religiöser
Mensch zu scheinen und zu sein" (RB, 212, 214,5) — It is clear from what
we have said that this "lost origin" can never be realized or fully grasped
in the religions; yet it is there. Such an admission is impossible in KD 17,
for Christomonism demands that man* relationship to God be established
and experienced solely in Christ. In KD 17, therefore, the sole "Quelle"
of religion is man's "Vermögen in der Welt und Mensch zu sein." (KD 17,
354) Nothing eise!
A to the function of religion, Barth can take a step further and,
again cautiously and sometimes unclearly, speak about a form of revela-
tion — "Offenbarungseindrücke" — before Christ, which somehow can
be present in religion. (RB, 67, 225) These "impressions of revelation"
are indeed of an "unbekanntem Gott", yet they provide a "Hinweis auf
Gott... auf die neue Welt" (RB, 40). "Zeichen, Zeugnis, Abbild, Erinne-
rung, Hinweis ist die geschichtliche Wirklichkeit allen Offenbarungsein-
drucks, Hinweise auf die Offenbarung selbst..." (RB, 105—106) They
provide man with reminders, "Erinnerungen", "Anamnesis" of his orig-
inal union with God (RB, 188, 212, 234, 94), with "der irgendwie be-
stimmten Erkenntnis, daß er zu Gott gehört." (RB, 224) Barth calls these
remembrances "... das Licht göttlicher Gegenwart und Offenbarung."
(RB 151) They teil man that even though he is now shackled to the finite
world, he is meant to be more; there is a "dualism" in his nature. (RB,
212, 251—52) The incompleteness is expressed in the tensions, dissatis-
factions, in the "Kampf" and " Widerspruchs volles Geschehen des
Lebens". (RB, 359, 241) All of which, then, become a pointer to "Erret-
tung" (RB, 359); whether expressed in Moses, or in John the Baptist or
Plato or socialism, they can be "Berufung, Verheissung, Gleichnisfähig-
keit ...", a "Symptom" of what God wills for man, "Gelegenheiten und
offene Türen ... die, von Gott aus gesehen, zur Besinnung rufen, zur
Erkenntnis leiten könnten," (RB, 53—54), "Möglichkeiten, Gelegenhei-
ten, Zeugnisse für die Erkenntnis seiner Gerechtigkeit". (RB, 70) Barth,
of course, insists that through the religions man will never achieve this
knowledge (RB, 23); God's real revelation will always be beyond these
impressions, never identified with them. (RB, 67) Yet some form of en-
during communication between God and man seems to be made possible.
The "Ziel" cannot not be seen; but the "Wegweiser" remains. (RB, 62)
23 Therefore Barth could say in his in t roduct ion to RB that he wanted to trace the
difference between God and man "in seiner negativen und positiven Bedeutung".
RB, XIV, cmphasis mine.
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Precisely in and by their insufficiency, — their failure — the reli-
gions realize their central function: to show man the tragic fUtility of his
own attempts to reach the "Something" f rom which he has been separated
and for which he is still meant. (RB, 232, 220) Barth interprets this pri-
mary role of the religions according to the traditional understanding of
the Gesetz. In the religions man not only becomes a sinner (äs we
described above), he realizes he is a sinner. This is the "Sinn" of
all religion: to lead man "zur Erfahrung seines Abfalls von Gott." (RB,
226; cf. also 241), "to allow sin to appear", (RB, 65, 164), to make sin
an "anschauliche Gegebenheit unserer Existenz" (RB, 228, 224, 236).
Thus the religions convince man that he cannot make it alone. They
proclaim the "Krisis" and the "Katastrophe" of all that is human (RB,
224, 235), "die totale Fragwürdigkeit aller menschlichen Möglichkeiten"
(RB, 56; cf. also 226), "die ganze Unzulänglichkeit seines (man's) Wis-
sens und Wollens" (RB, 164). "Das ganze unerbittliche Halt" is erected
before all his own attempts to rediscover his lost origin. (RB, 164)
By proclaiming this frustrating "Halt", the religions indirectly,
negatively but truly prepare man for the "unmögliche Möglichkeit" —
God's Intervention, God's "Ja" which takes shape in the burned-out
structures of his "Nein". The deepest meaning and purpose of the reli-
gions Barth sees in their "Negativität". Precisely in their negativity, they
are "höchster Hinweis auf die Positivität des Göttlichen innerhalb der
menschlichen Realität." (RB, 213) In establishing this Nein they can
"zum Glauben einladen" (RB, 106—107), they mark "den Punkt, wo
alle menschlichen Möglichkeiten in das Licht der göttlichen treten", they
direct man to "das Außerhalb der Humanität" (RB, 236—237, 105).
Barth holds that the religions "die Augen schärfen" for that which "wir
über die Grenzen der Religion hinweg bereits (!) ausschauten." (RB, 239)
Religion sets the limits of mankind, "damit uns jenseits der Grenze, die
durch sie bezeichnet ist, Gott begegne." (RB, 224)
Barth therefore sees a certain negative necessity in the function of
the religions. God's Ja requires a Nein. Grace cannot enter mid-stage
until religion has first played its role and "negatively prepared" the
way. "... das Überströmen der Gnade, das in jedem zeitlichen Augen-
blick ohne das 'Überfließen' der Sünde in der Religion nicht geschehen
kann." (RB, 165; cf. 114—115) If the religions must be "aufgehoben",
this Aufhebung is necessary for the further construction of God's plan; in
a negative sense, God needs the religion. We should not try to "avoid" or
"set aside" the religions. (RB, 224) Barth admits a "relative Anerken-
nung", a "relatives Recht" for religion. He can even say: "Und Religion
zu wecken, wachzuhalten, und zu pflegen, vor allem aber zu reformieren,
nein immer wieder zu revolutionieren, ist eine Aufgabe, die wahrlich,
wenn irgendeine innerhalb der Humanität, des Schweißes der Edlen wert
ist." (RB, 237) --
'
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To allow the religions this negative role of the Gesetz becomes abso-
lutely impossible in KD 17 — simply because Christ becomes the Gesetz.
Only in him can man feel the reality of his sinful, helpless, needy position.
Barth's Christomonism destroys Luther's — and Paul's — understanding
of the law and robs the religions even of a possible negative role in
salvation (KD 17, 339—40; 395).24
Because of the religions' lost but still actual divine origin, because of
their negatively necessary function, Barth can also speak, sometimes quite
glowingly, of a real fulfillment of the religions (not just religion!) in
Christ. He is "das Ziel, von dem alle menschliche Religion Zeugnis gibt
... das Ziel der menschlichen Bedürfnisse, Wünsche und Strebungen"
which are expressed in the religions. (RB, 359) Barth dares to call God's
justification in Christ "... die Erfüllung aller Verheißung ... den Sinn
aller Religion ... die Beantwortung alles menschlichen Hoffens." (RB,70)
Christ's light is "... das Licht aller Religionsgeschichte und Wahrheits-
geschichte, das Weihnachtswunder, auf das die ganze Adventswelt der
Natur und der Geschichte, der sichtbaren und unsichtbaren Kreaturen
hinblickt als auf die Erfüllung ihres Wartens"! (RB, 93) Indeed, this ful-
fillment and this answering will always be something entirely beyond the
religions, never "ein Teil, nicht eine Strecke," of the history of religions.
The eternal "Nein" must be spoken over the religions — but precisely
through this negation the religions and their content of "Oifenbarungs-
eindrücke" are "nicht ausgelöscht, nicht vernichtet, sondern bestätigt, be-
währt und bekräftigt." In their Aufhebung, they find their meaning and
fulfillment. Therefore their "Gericht ist nicht Vernichtung sondern Auf-
richtung. Reinigung ist nicht Entleerung, sondern Erfüllung." (RB, 52—
53) We can speak of a "negative fulfillment" of the religions in Christ.
— Such a fulfillment of "Religionsgeschichte" — of the religions — be-
comes in KD 17 completely inadmissable. As we shall see in the next
section, Barth's Christomonism permits Christ to be the "Sinn" of only
one religion25.
24 Nürnberger, pp. 167—68; Althaus, Christliche Wahrheit, p. 59. By 1927 Barth's
understanding of the Gesetz had changed; he no longer identified the religions with
the law. This came about during his Calvin studies while lecturing in Münster, cf.
Ulrich Mann, "Religion als theologisches Problem", Christentum und Religion
(Regensburg, 1966), p. 65—67.
25 The "partial acceptance" of the religions which we have sketched in this section
belongs to what Barth latcr called a "rechte 'theologia naturalis'" which he feil into
in his earlier works " . . . zuletzt noch sehr handgreiflich in dem Aufsatz 'Kirche und
Kultur' 1927 und an manchen Stellen meiner im selben Jahr erschienenen 'Prolego-
menaV (cf. "Nein. Antwort an E. Brunner," p. 7; also KD I/l, p. VIII; also
Heinrich Leipold, Theorie der Verkündigung. Der Streit um die Frage der An-
knüpfung' zwischen E. Brunner und K. Barth, Habilitationsschrift, handschr., Mar-
burg, 1969, p. 345 ff, 324—29, 332—37.)
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///. In Christo Una Religio
A. KD17: Justification of One Religion
There are passages in KD 17 which seem to indicate a much more
positive attitude toward religion than anything we found in RB. Clearly,
directly, Barth states that God's revelation must also have a "human",
a "subjective" side. In order to be a "dem Menschen widerfahrendes
Ereignis" it must assume "die Gestalt menschlicher Zuständlichkeit, Er-
fahrung und Tätigkeit..." (KD 17, 305) And this means that revelation
must also be religion! (KD 17, 308) God' revelation becomes his pre-
sence in the world of religions. (KD 17, 306—07) Perhaps we have inter-
preted Barth's christomonistic understanding of revelation too harshly.
The "Aufhebung" of religion through revelation also has a positive mean-
ing. It assumes religion; it implies not only "destructio" but also "eleva-
tio".2' This is implied in Barth's summary of KD 17: "Gottes Offen-
barung in der Ausgießung des Heiligen Geistes ist die richtende, aber auch
versöhnende Gegenwart Gottes in der Welt menschlicher Religion..."
(KD 17, 304, emphasis mine) And more clearly: "Die Aufhebung der
Religion durch die Offenbarung braucht nicht bloß zu bedeuten: ihre
Negation, nicht bloß das Urteil: Religion ist Unglaube. Die Religion kann
in der Offenbarung, obwohl und indem ihr jenes Urteil gilt, wohl aufge-
hoben, sie kann von ihr gehalten, und in ihr geborgen, sie kann durch sie
gerechtfertigt werden..." (KD 17, 357) Religion, like the sinner, can be
justified. This is certainly more than the "negative fulfillment" we found
inRB.
But when Barth goes on to describe this "Rechtfertigung", he reveals
it äs the epitome of his christomonistic understanding of religion, for he
insists that Justification of religion can take place: 1) only in the reality
of Jesus Christ and 2) in a way in which nothing is taken over or "an-
swered" from the world of religions. The Justification applies only to a
religion; not to the religions.
"Only in the reality of Jesus Christ" — all of Barth's positive State-
ments about religion in KD 17 are tied solely — "christomonistically" —
to this condition. Barth clearly admits that for him religion can have a
positive value and be "justified" only according to the Schema of the
assumptio carnis. Religion is related to revelation äs Christ's human
nature to the divine person: the unity between the two is limited to a
"vollendetes Geschehen". Before this event, before this "assuming",
Christ's human nature had no meaning; it existed only äs a possibility.
26 Aagaard, pp. 164—167; Benkt-Erik Benktson, Christus und die Religion, Der Reli-
gionsbegriff bei Barth, Bonhoeffer und Tillich (Stuttgart, 1967), pp. 62—63;
W. A. Whitehous in The Scottish Journal of Theology 14 (1961) 146, Stresses the
positive content of "Aufhebung" and would translate it with "superseding".
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The same can be said of religion. (KD 17, 323—324) Only "als Annex
der menschlichen Natur Jesus Christi" can it have any kind of positive
meaning.(KD17,382)27
Therefore, if Barth admits "in seiner Offenbarung ist Gott gegen-
wärtig mitten in der Welt menschlicher Religion", then this can be said
only "in Erinnerung an die christologische Lehre von der assumptio car-
nis"; i. e. this presence is limited to "jenem Geschehen zwischen Gott und
Mensch". KD 17, 324) Barth's vocabulary indicates how he jealously
limits the justification of religion to the historical, definable, visible real-
ity of the Incarnation. "... die offenbare Gottestatsache des Namens
Jesus Christus ... bezeichnet ... ein ganz bestimmtes Geschehen (!), an
dem die Welt der Religionen einen ganz bestimmten Anteil bekommt."
Only one religion is justified. "Die Gottestatsache (!) des Namens Jesus
Christus bestätigt... was keine andere Tatsache bestätigt noch bestätigen
kann, die Schöpfung und Erwählung gerade ihrer Religion zur einen,
einzigen (!), wahren Religion." (KD 17, 390—391) "Daß es eine wahre
Religion gibt, das ist Ereignis im Akt der Gnade Gottes in Jesus
Christus..." (KD 17, 377) Only that religion which is linked to this
"Geschehen", to this "Tatsache", "Ereignis", "Akt" — only that reli-
gion which is "Eigentum Christi", and is in his "Bereich und Reich" —
(KD 17, 322) — only this religion is lifted "aus der Menge der anderen
als die wahre Religion". (KD 17, 357) Outside of Christ, als Calvin held,
religion is only "... eine Größe x, die ihren Inhalt und ihre Form nur (!)
dadurch empfängt, daß sie von der Offenbarung in sich aufgenommen
und zu ihrer Gestalt gemacht wird." (KD 17, 310; cf. Instit. I, 3, If; l, 4,
1; 12, l)28 Here, then, we have Barth's christomonistic Interpretation of
the religions at its blatant best.
This justification takes place in such a way that nothing really is
assumed from the world of religions (not even a "negative content" —
cf. above). If Christianity is justified in Christ, this does not depend on or
have anything to do with its quality äs "religion". Here we can under-
stand Barth's remarks about Christianity not being different from other
religions. The Christian religion's justification in no way implies an
"immanent content of truth or value" (KD 17, 369) — a truth it might
share with other religions. Nor does it have any kind of "religious self-
consciousness äs such" (KD 17, 364). If one looks at this "true religion",
one surprisingly finds no external differences from the other false reli-
gions: the same "göttliche Anklage auf Götzendienst und Werkgerech-
27 cf. Aagaard, p. 169.
28 And this, it would seem, is the esscntial lack in Song's dissertation, referred to above:
he fails to realize that all of Barth's positive Statements on "religion" are limited
to the context of the "assumptio carnis". \Vhere Barth speaks of this one religion
being justified in Christ, Song too hastily read "the religions". cf. op. cit.,
pp. 106—124,296.
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tigkeit" (KD 17, 378), the same sad story of "Unglaube und Sünde",
the same "Widerspruch"against God's grace (KD 17, 389, 369). This true
religion shows "... in ihrer Gestalt, aber auch in ihrer menschlichen Wur-
zel sündige Geschichte, nicht weniger, als dies von der Geschichte des
Buddhismus oder des Islam zu sagen ist." (KD 17, 387)
How, then, is Christianity the true religion? The ans wer again lies
deep in Barth's Christomonism. The justification of religion is related
so "exclusively" to Christ that nothing of religion äs religion plays a
role in this justification; one can even say that nothing of religion äs
religion is really effected by this justification. All comes from Christ and,
in a sense, remains with him. This is best seen in the image Barth uses to
describe the justification of religion: äs the light of the sun falls on one
part of the earth and not on the other, enlightening one part and leaving
the other in darkness, without really changing the earth, so Christ's light
falls on the world of religions, making one of these religions light and
true and leaving the rest in darkness and falsehood — but without bring-
ing any essential change to the true religion. (KD 17, 388) All depends,
simply, on the sun shining here and not there, on the "Akt der göttlichen
Erwählung". "Die christliche Religion ist darum die wahre Religion, weil
es ... Gott ... gefallen hat, nun gerade sie als die wahre Religion zu be-
jahen ..." (KD 17, 384) This is what Barth means when he says that
Christianity is the true religion "durch die Gnade Gottes" or "durch den
Namen Jesus Christus" — simply that God's grace shines on her, Christ's
name is spoken over her and therefore she is the true religion. Her sin, her
resistance to grace, her idolatry remain — but they are forgiven in
the sunlight of Christ; God speaks his "Ja" over her. (KD 17, 379—380,
363, 369, 389) This is the essential, the only difference between Christian-
ity and the other religions: Christianity Stands in this sunlight. No
matter how good and true the other religions may be, they are f alse, use-
less — because they are not in this light.
Barth gives an example: he compares Christianity with the Buddhistic "grace
religions'* of Jodo-Shin and Jodo-Shin-Shu. These religions have a remarkable grasp
of the basic truth of Chistianity — that all must come from God through grace, that
man is totally helpless to save himself. (KD 17, 372—374) But even if their doctrine
of grace and faith would be exactly the same äs that of Christianity, even then, Barth
insists, the drastic difference would remain! The grace-religions would be false, useless;
only the Christian religion would be true. Why? "Entscheidend über die Wahrheit und
Lüge ist wirklich nur Eines ... dieses Eine ist der Name Jesus Christus, (der) ganz allein
die Wahrheit unserer Religion ausmacht!" (KD 17, 376) Only Christianity Stands in the
light of Christ's name. The truth of a religion, therefore, lies not in its religious
doctrine of grace, but in the "Wirklichkeit der Gnade selbst" — only through this
reality "wird die eine Religion von anderen als die wahre angenommen und ausgezeich-
net". (KD 17, 371) And only Christianity has this reality!
Stating it somewhat simply, we might say that the Christian religion
is the true religion because we can place the word "Christian" in front
of it. Or äs Nürnberger puts it, the justification of religion consists
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essentially and exclusively in Christ becoming the Subject of religion
without really changing the "Aktinhalt" of religion, i. e. without really
changing religion itself. Christ "takes over". He becomes, äs it were, the
new driver; whidi means indeed that the course of the vehicle is changed,
but the vehicle itself remains the same. In the religions, man is the sub-
ject; in Christianity Christ becomes the subject; but in the "Aktinhalt"
of both, there is no real difference.29 Christ, in other words, does not
really assume religion; religion remains essentially what it was.
Once it is understood that Chrianity's truth does not He in its quality of religion
but only in its having the "Tatsache" of Christ äs its subject, Barth admits that certain
secondary changes take place. Christianity's justification does include its santification.
God is "wirklich erkannt und verehrt" and "ein Handel des mit Gott versöhnten Men-
schen" takes place. (KD 17, 377) In Christ, Christianity is "ausgesondert, durch ihn
geformt und gestaltet, für seinen Dienst in Anspruch genommen, zur geschichtlichen
Erscheinung und zum geschichtlichen Mittel seiner Offenbarung". (KD 17, 393) She is
given an "Auftrag" and a "Mission" to step before the other religions "zum Einlenken
auf den christlichen Weg einzuladen und aufzufordern". (KD 17, 392, cf. also 395)
And yet, Barth continually insists that such positive characteristics in Christianity are
only "symptoms", only "signs" of a reality which is constantly beyond her and never
identified with her. (KD 17, 372, 377) They in no way can be "proofs" for her truth —
or for the truth of any religion. Truth lies solely in Christ äs the subject of a religion —
of one religion.
Our initial assertion would now seem to be a valid conclusion: Barth's
understanding of the "justification of religion" represents the final and
füllest expression of his Christomonism. Because religion can be justified
in Christ, it has absolutely no meaning, or purpose or value outside of
Christ. Only in Christ can the "subject" of religion be changed. To allow
this to take place outside of Christ, i. e. outside of the Christian religion,
would be to contradict the reality of Christ äs a "Tatsache", äs a unique
"Geschehen". But even in Christ religion has no meaning of itself; it
remains human, immanent. Therefore, there is no possibility whatsoever
of relating Christianity to the other religions, of bringing about any kind
of encounter.80 One might compare the contents of Christianity with the
Contents of other religions and even though one may find some similarity,
even identity, one has not yet touciiecf that which makes Christianity the
true religion: its Subject. This is something entirely beyond the religions,
somethings "incomparable". In his christomonistic understanding of
Christianity's "truth" Barth has rclativized the Christian religion phe-
nomenologically (äs to the "Aktinhalt" there is no difference from other
religions) but has absolutized it theologically (its "Subject" is totally and
absolutely removed from the world of religions).
29 Nürnberger, pp. 66—70, 123—127; also id., "Systematisch-theologische Lösungs-
versuche zum Problem der anderen Religionen und ihre missionsmethodischen Kon-
sequenzen," NZSyThR, 12 (1970) 16—24.
30 Aagaard, pp. 179—80; Nürnberger, pp. 123—124.
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B. RB: Justification "extra Christum sed propter Christum"
RB, äs would be expected, does not contain such an extended and
integrated Statement on the possibility of religion's justification äs KD 17
does. In RB Barth's primary intent was to trace clearly the lime between
time and eternity and to let God pronounce his "no" over all that is
human — especially the religions. He did not yet focus on God's "yes"
in Christ — a Singular "yes" whidi included the singular justification of
religion. Yet even in RB Barth — less clearly, less frequently, and more
cautiously — allows for a certain "assuming" and acceptance of religion
in the process of justification. He admits religion äs a necessary "unver-
meidlicher seelischer Reflex (Erlebnis) des an der Seele sich ereigenden
Wunders des Glaubens." Religion becomes a "Zeichen und Zeugnis" of
faith. (RB, 105) More generally, Barth sees religion äs a necessary
"Begleitungserscheinung des Glaubens" because faith also must have its
"gesetzliche", visible, subjective side. (cf. RB, 110, 162, 212) Thus Barth
can even venture to say: "Es gibt eine Rechtfertigung der religiösen
Gebärde." (RB, 113)
But the essential and crucial difference between RB and KD 17 is
that in RB the possibility of religion's justification is not rooted so firmly
and exclusively in Barth's Christomonism. In RB Barth does not affirm
the justification of religion according to the "analogy" (whidi is really
more than an analogy) of the assumptio carnis. The possibility of God
assuming or making use of religion is not limited explicitly to the unique,
singular "Tatsache" and particular "Geschehen" in which he took on
flesh; religion in RB is in no way compared (and identified) with Christ's
human nature. This is seen f rom the context in whidi Barth speaks of reli-
gion's justification. In RB he does so usually by relating and subordinating
religion to faith (RB, 105, 110, 113, 162), i.e. that mysterious reality in
which God asserts his priority and transcendence and accepts man's
nothingness. In KD 17 Barth explains religion's justification by its rela-
tion and Subordination to revelation, i. e. that unique, historical reality,
taking place only in Christ. (KD 17, 306—07, 327, 329, 332) In RB, then,
Barth seems content with the more general principle that religion can
have meaning only by bowing to the divine transcendence; in KD 17 this
act of reverence and Subordination must take place through the unique,
historical expression of this transcendence in Jesus Christ's revelation81.
And because in RB the justification of religion is not yet so clearly
admitted nor jealusly restriced to the reality of the assumptio carnis>
it is understandable that Barth in RB does not speak of "a true religion".
He does not yet speak in the singular, i. e. about one religion being lifted
81 This is not to say that in RB Barth did not hold that faith is possible only in Christ;
yet this dependence was not tied so explicitly to Christ äs a "unique event".
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out of the morass of religious history and being assumed by the divine
Subject.
True, in the last pages of RB Barth does turn his eyes directly to the Churdi; he
does admit that the Churdi is in posession of God's Word (RB, 325), that "das ewige
Licht ... leuchtet ihr ..." so that the "unmögliche Möglichkeit Gottes ... liege im
Bereich ihrer Möglichkeiten". (RB, 358) A certain "Aufnahme" of the Church by God
takes place (RB, 391), a possible justification (RB, 381); the Church receives a mission
and an "Aufgabe". (RB, 402) And yet, Barth's treatment of the Church in RB is
pronouncedly different from his presentation of Christianity äs the true religion in
KD 17.82 In RB Barth does not explicitly insist that the Church's role is unique,
exclusive, that only she is the "subjektive Wirklichkeit der Offenbarung", that only in
her can religion be taken over by Christ and have a meaning. On the contrary, Barth
sees the role of the Church äs that of carrying out the role of all religions — fully,
completely, to the last frustrating limits. More than the other religions, she fails in her
task; the possibility of hearing God's Word and accepting his light is not realized.
(RB 372, 325) She could be ("wäre") a religious "Ort" different from the religions
but this possibility escapes her. (RB, 362, 372—73) She could be "the Church of Jacob"
(the true religion), but she remains "the Church of Esau". (RB 326, 324—44) She too
"makes a creature" out of God; she too becomes an "Aufhebung" of the Gospel
(RB, 316—17); she too falls into atheism (RB, 375). Thus she is the very last "mensch-
liche Möglichkeit", the "Kathastrophe der menschlichen Gipfelmöglichkeit" (RB, 377),
where man's Opposition to God attains its "sublimste ... Form" (RB, 403). — The
difference (the only difference!) is that in Christ the Chruch knows — she believes —
that God can accept this failure; that he can pronounce his "yes" in the midst of this
"no"; that man must first be crushed in Order to be raised up. (RB, 375—78, 381)
All this happens in her, but it is not really defineable or traceable in her, not limited
to her; it also happens beyond her. (RB, 383) Because God pronounces his "yes",
invisibly, paradoxically in the Chruch, this "yes" echos through the universe. Thus the
Church, by being (like the religions) nothing but "Not und Schuld" and by realizing
that God accepts this "Not und Schuld", becomes "die Hoffnung des Menschen über-
haupt, die unerhörte Rechtfertigung und Rettung alles dessen, was der Mensch, nicht-
wissend was er tut, unternimmt und vollendet". (RB, 404, 387—88) The Church's
difference from the religions would seem to be that she knows God can do in her what
he can do outside her: accept and justify man. The other religions do not know this.83 —
In KD 17, God also pronounces his "yes" ovcr the sinful, insufficient Christian religion;
but this "yes" seems to be limited to her. She alone is "die einzige, wahre Religion".
82 Balthasar, p. 98.
33 One cannot help noting the similarit ics between this aspect of Barth's ecclesiology
and modern Catholic explanations of the Church's "Heilsnotwendigkeit" äs the
"signum universale salutis". The Church's salvific instrumentality is found in her
being the unique, historical, and enduring sign of God's "yes" to man in Christ.
Because this "yes" is spoken and heard in the Church, it is also to be found outside
the Church, in other religions. Naturally, Barth's view differs fundamentally äs to
how the Chruch is a sign of salvation. cf. Sccond Vatican Council, Dogmatic Cons-
titutation on the Chruch, par. l, 16, 48; Decree on the Missionary Activity of the
Chrurch, par. 1; Karl Rahner, "Christentum und die nichtchristlichen Religionen",
Schriften zur Theologie, V, pp. 136—158; id., Schriften VI, "Konziliare Lehre der
Kirche und künftige Wirklichkeit christlichen Lebens", Schriften VI, pp. 479—488;
Johannes Feiner, "Kirche und Heilsgeschichte", Gott in Welt, Vol II (Freiburg, 1964),
pp. 317—345; Hans Küng, "The World R.eligions in God's Plan of Salvation",
Christian Revelation and World Religions (London, 1967), pp. 25—66; Edward
Schillebeeckx, "The Chruch and Mankind", Concilium, l (1965) 34—50.
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Thus Barth in RB clearly states that God can carry on his work of
justification among other religious men, outside the Curch, outside Christ
(but always because of Christ). "Durch Jesus ... haben wir die Augen
bekommen, zu sehen ..." that "vor und nach Jesus ... viele wandeln im
Lichte der Erlösung ... daß Gott allenthalben gefunden wird." (RB, 71).
We understand that there are "... überall, auch in den Tiefen, Zugänge
zu Gott." (RB, 44—45) "Immer und überall war Vergebung der Sün-
den ..." (RB, 64) God's love and his ability to justify are free, unable to
be contained in any one event. "Gott ist frei." (RB, 370) Thus the true
Churdi, the Church of Jacob, in whidi "das Wunder geschieht"and man
is justified, is universal, "... ohne Ausdehnung noch Beschränkung, ohne
Ort noch Namen ... ohne Mitgliedschaft noch Ausschluß dieser oder jener,
rund in ihr ist Gottes freie Gnade, Berufung, und Wahl Eins und Alles."
(RB, 326)
Of course, we cannot argue that this freedom and universality of
God's grace implies a justification of the religions äs religions. Barth
explicitly warns against concluding to a "religiöses Apriori" behind all
the religions whidi would give them a value of their own. (RB, 370) Yet,
because Barth in RB does not christomonistically hold to only one religion
in Christ, he could — indirectly and implicitly — allow the religions to
have a certain share or play a certain role in justification. Naturally this
will never be anything more than the negative, dialectical, contradictory
role played by the Churdi herseif.
We have already seen how Barth can allow the religions (like the
Churdi) to carry out the negative work of the "Gesetz" — i. e. to con-
vince man of his total insufficiency and thus prepare him for God's
"yes" in Christ. Barth also describes the possible justification of the
heathen in the same way he portrays the justification of Christians: in
their religious undertakings, in their "good works" in their mislead,
futile seardiing for God. God can overlook all this; his "Erbarmen" can
accept what his "Zorn" should reject. (RB, 344—45; also 50) The
"Werke des Gesetzes" among the heathen (their religions!) can become
"von Gott aus betraditet, etwas Wertvolles, Schätzbares, Ausgezeichne-
tes." (RB, 64), just äs the insufficiency of the Christian religion (its Akt-
inhalt) is mysteriously accepted and justified by Christ (receives Christ äs
its subject). All this takes place beyond the religions; yet also, in them.
Barth also directly admits that the heathen äs heathen, "in ihrer
heitern Kreatürlidikeit und Weltlidikeit, in der schlichten anspruchslosen
Sadilidikeit ihres Tuns sind ... von Got erkannt und erkennen ihn wieder
... sind nicht ohne Ausblick auf den silbernen Rand von Erlösung und
Vergebung." Thus their life — and this would imply their religion — can
be a "Gleichnis ... vielleicht ein so vollkommenes Gleichnis, daß es sdion
darin seine Rechtfertigung hat." (RB, 41). Finally, because God's reve-
lation is free and because it can find "ein neues Flußbett" outside the
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Jewish and Christian religions — "... darum ist es doch ein Irrtum, die
'Heiden' so ohne weiteres Schläfer, Ungläubige und Ungerechte zu nen-
nen. Audi sie können Gottesfürchtige, von Gott Erwählte sein — ohne
ändern als solche kenntlich zu werden." On the basis of this revelation,
channeled through their religions, Barth hints at "eine befremdliche Form
von Glauben" among the heathen. (RB, 41—42)
Also in KD 17 Barth admits that the heathen are embraced in
Christ's redemption (KD 17, 324), but according to the demands of his
Christomonism, he in no way can allow the religions to share or play a
role in this justification. Just how the heathen are saved remains an open
question (to be answered at the end of time). In the meantime, if "Gott
den gottlosen Menschen samt seiner Religion aus Gnade versöhnt" (KD
17, 326), then this religion can only be Christianity. Otherwise Jesus
Christ does not remain Jesus Christ!
Conclusion: Althaus' diagnosis would seem to be correct: if Barth
in KD 17 feit he could not allow any form of revelation in the religions,
if he had to brand the entire history of religions äs "Unglaube", if he
could permit the justification of only one religion — then he did so only
in the name of Jesus Christ, i. e. because of his monistic understanding of
Christ.34 In RB, where his Christomonism was not yet fully formed, his
views on the religions were tempered. — Our study of Barth makes clear
that any "theology of the religions", whether Reformed or Luthern or
Catholic, is linked essentially to Christology. Our ability to understand
the religions and to dialogue with them will be determined by our under-
standing of Jesus Christ.
34 As stated above, the question whether Barth's Christomonism in later volumes of KD
changed sufficiently enough to enable him to view the religions differently must be
answered in a further study.
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